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ABSTRACT
Emerging market economies, which have much of their growth ahead of them, run persistent current
account deficits in order to smooth consumption intertemporally. The counterpart of these deficits
is their dependence on capital inflows, which can suddenly stop. In this paper we develop and
estimate a quantifiable model of sudden stops and use it to study practical mechanisms to insure
emerging markets against them. We first assess the standard practice of protecting the current
account through the accumulation of international reserves and conclude that, even when optimally
managed, this mechanism is expensive and incomplete. External insurance, on the other hand, is hard
to obtain because sudden stops often come together with distress in emerging market investors
themselves (the most natural insurers). Thus, one needs to find global (non-emerging-market-
specific) assets that are correlated to sudden stops. We show an example of such an asset based on
the S&P 500's implied volatility index. If added to these countries portfolios, it would significantly
enhance their sudden stop risk-management strategies. In our simulations, the median gain in terms
of reserves available at the time of sudden stop is around 30 percent. Moreover, in instances where
the level of non-contingent reserves is low, the median gain is close to 300 percent. We also find that
as countries manage to reduce the size of the sudden stops that afflict them, they should reduce their
stock of reserves and significantly increase their share of contingent reserves. The main insights of









The Wharton School1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Emerging market economies, which have much of their growth ahead of them, run persistent current account
deﬁcits in order to smooth consumption intertemporally. The funding of these deﬁcits is a perennial source
of fragility since it requires ongoing capital inﬂows which can suddenly stop. While in many circumstances
the breakdown in capital inﬂo w ss i m p l ya m p l i f yd o m e s t i cd e ﬁciencies, there is extensive evidence that in
many others the main culprit is not the country itself but the international ﬁnancial markets’ response to
shocks only vaguely related to the country’s actions.
The real costs of this volatility for countries that experience open crises are dramatic and well known.
Less noticed, but at least as important in terms of their pervasiveness and cumulative impact, are the large
costs paid by prudent economies. These economies do not fall into open crises but are forced to incur in a
variety of costly precautionary measures and build large war-chests of international reserves, a trend that
has only increased in the aftermath of the capital ﬂow crises of the late 1990s. Chile and South Korea,
for example, hold close to 20 percent of GDP in reserves, which contrasts with the 4 to 5 percent held by
developed open economies such as Australia or Canada. How eﬀective are reserves in smoothing the impact
of sudden stops unrelated to a country’s actions? How much of them should be accumulated? How fast?
Are there potentially less costly ﬁnancial mechanisms to deal with capital ﬂow volatility? Who would be the
natural counterpart for these mechanisms? How are these mechanisms limited by ﬁnancial and collateral
constraints?
These are among the most pressing questions for policy-makers and researchers in emerging market
economies and the international ﬁnancial institutions. Unfortunately, while there has been signiﬁcant con-
ceptual progress over the last two decades in understanding some of the limitations of ﬁnancial contracting
with emerging markets, there has been much less progress in providing an integral framework to analyze
these questions quantitatively. In this paper we take one step in this direction.
In a nutshell, our framework considers three type of agents: An emerging market country, specialist
investors, and the world capital markets at large. The essence of an emerging market economy for the
problem we wish to model has two ingredients: First, its future income is signiﬁcantly higher than its
current income so it would like to borrow and run persistent current account deﬁcits. Second, it has great
diﬃculty in pledging future income to ﬁnance these deﬁcits. Specialists can alleviate this problem but they
themselves are subject to shocks that limit their ability to commit to deliver resources. These shocks, which
in our model are driven by a Poisson process, trigger a period of signiﬁcantly reduced capital inﬂows. The
beginning of this period is the sudden stop stop itself, when specialists are unable to rollover all their explicit
or implicit short term commitments, but it can continue even after specialists recover as countries have to
rebuild their international collateral. For simplicity, we refer to the entire episode as a sudden stop.T h e
country would like to insulate its current account ﬁnancing from these sudden stops, but it cannot do so with
2its specialists since they are constrained during these events. Resorting to the world capital markets after
the sudden stop takes place does not work either, since the country has very limited credibility with non-
specialists. However, world capital markets can still be used ex-ante, as long as contracts and investments
are made contingent on variables that do not require emerging markets knowledge.
One of the main obstacles in building this type of structure for quantitative analysis is that it is in
principle quite complex, involving several layers of potential ﬁnanciers, contractual problems, and multiple
state variables. Our framework preserves some of this richness but it is at the same time manageable.
We make several stylized assumptions that allow us to represent the problem in terms similar to those
of managing the risk associated to an exogenous non-diversiﬁable “income” diﬀusion-jump process, and is
amenable to estimation.
A key simpliﬁcation is that countries’ and their specialists engage in growth-swaps. These swaps eliminate
debt-overhang type considerations and focus the analysis on the obtention of new, uncommitted, resources.
This is probably not an overly costly simpliﬁcation in terms of realism, as it isolates the most fragile source
of external ﬁnancing. Unlike existing liabilities, uncommitted resources cannot be forced to stay in through
renegotiation. It is perhaps for this reason that in practice sudden capital ﬂow reversals are more closely
associated to the current account deﬁcit (a ﬂow variable) than to the stock of debt (see, e.g., Calvo, Izquierdo
and Mejia (2004)).
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we discuss the pure reserves-management problem. Countries hoard (non-
contingent) international reserves to smooth the impact of sudden stops on the current account. Since
this is more or less what countries do in practice, we use this structure to estimate and calibrate the key
parameters of the model. First, we use a Bayesian-hidden-state model to estimate the sudden stop processes
for a small panel of emerging market economies with open capital accounts for at least two decades. Our
ﬁndings indicate that sudden stops are infrequent, but recurrent and costly events. In a typical sudden stop,
external funding declines by 10 percent or more, and its main impact lasts for over six years. Note that our
estimation procedure is designed to capture the impact of the sudden stop beyond any initial turmoil or short
run spike in interest rates. This is important because in practice current account reversals are signiﬁcantly
more persistent (and hence costly) than the initial impact of the sudden stop, which is what is often measured
(see, e.g., Calvo et al (2004)).1 Second, we conclude from this part that holding non-contingent international
reserves, as central banks do in practice, is a costly and incomplete sudden-stop insurance mechanism even
when managed optimally. Reserves require large consumption sacriﬁces prior to sudden stops per unit
1See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) for a model where sudden stops come together with a persistent decline in the
country’s ability to produce ﬁnancial assets, and hence to attract savings. Moreover, after the initial crash, interest rates
decline below the pre-crisis level, but inﬂows do not recover. This characterization is consistent with our empirical ﬁndings and
SS-identiﬁcation procedures in this paper.
3of protection, especially while their stock is being built. This is costly for emerging market economies,
which experience limited access to external resources even during normal times. Here again, the standard
practice of measuring the cost of hoarding reserves from the spread between US-Treasuries and country debt
underestimates the actual opportunity cost.
This takes us to the second part of the paper, where we expand the set of investments (or contracts)
countries can make. In particular, we consider the optimal inclusion of digital options on the VIX in the
country’s portfolio. The VIX is an index of implied volatilities extracted from options on S&P500 ﬁrms,
that simultaneously satisﬁes the conditions to appeal to world capital markets and to provide a good hedge
against sudden stop for emerging markets: It is a developed world variable that is highly correlated with
sudden stops. We discuss implementation and run the economy through simulations with the same sample
paths of sudden stops used in the case with only non-contingent reserves. Relative to the latter case, the
median gain in terms of reserves available at the time of sudden stop is about 30 percent. Moreover, in
instances where the level of non-contingent reserves is low (lower quintile) and hence the cost of a sudden
stop is high, the median gain is close to 300 percent.
In terms of dynamics, these observations mean that a country should ﬁrst build the contingent part of the
portfolio aggressively, adding non-contingent reserves only gradually. The reason for this strategy is that the
country is particularly concerned about the worst possible event. That is, to be found without resources at
the time of a sudden stop. When the stock of reserves is small, the best chance of avoiding this worst-event
is by getting a large contingent payment at the time of the sudden stop. When the stock of reserves is large,
the worst-event is more likely to take place if the country overcommits to contingent contracts and these do
not deliver, than by holding a large amount of non-contingent reserves.
Extrapolating these dynamic implications to the cross-section, we ﬁnd that as countries improve along
dimensions that reduce the size of their sudden stops, they should not only reduce their reserves accumulation
but also reallocate their portfolios toward more contingent instruments.
Finally, we show that the insights developed for reserves management extend more generally to external
liquidity and liability management. Non-contingent debt with world capital markets has the same deﬁciencies
that non-contingent reserves have, and hence can be improved by adding contingencies similar to those
discussed for reserves. These contingencies can be obtained by either embedding them in the debt itself or
by raising the contingent component of reserves.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. The main shock that concerns us here is a sudden
stop of capital inﬂows. The literature on sudden stops gained new life since the Asian and Russian crises.
The work of Calvo (1998) describes the basic mechanics and implications of sudden stops and Calvo and
Reinheart (1999) document the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. The modelling of these sudden stops as
the tightening of a Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) style collateral constraint is also present in the work of Caballero
4and Krishnamurthy (2001), Arellano and Mendoza (2002) and Broner et al. (2003), among others.
As an intermediate step in developing our substantive argument and quantifying the eﬀects we describe,
we model reserves accumulation as a buﬀer stock model against capital ﬂow reversals. The view that reserves
can be used to cushion the impact of external shocks exists at least since Heller (1966), was enhanced by
the work on precautionary savings in macroeconomics during the 1980s and has recently returned to the
fore with the large accumulation of reserves exhibited by emerging markets since the crises at the end of the
1990s (see, e.g., Lee (2004)).
Importantly, the main reason for seeking insurance and hedging in our context is not income ﬂuctuation
per-se but the potential tightening of a ﬁnancial constraint. This motive parallels that highlighted by Froot
et al (1993) at the level of corporations, and by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) for emerging markets.
While the substantive themes developed in those articles diﬀer from ours, the basic model in our paper is in
many respects a dynamic version of theirs.
Closely related to our recommendations are those in the sovereign debt literature. The optimality of
contingent debt and the limitations to it imposed by ﬁnancial frictions are also a feature of that literature.
In particular, the work of Kletzer, Newbery and Wright (1992) and Kletzer and Wright (2000), characterize
feasible ﬁnancial structures consistent with diﬀerent degrees of commitment by a sovereign borrower and
its lenders. Our collateral constraints capture features similar to those of their richer limited enforcement
framework. Our paper reinforces much of the message in that literature and provides a tractable model that
can be estimated and quantiﬁed.
The interaction between precautionary savings and ﬁnancial constraints is also present in the closed
economy framework of Aiyagari (1994). He calibrated such a model to estimates of US microeconomic
income processes and other parameters and concluded that eventually agents would save enough to relax
all ﬁnancial constraints. Our model has similar ingredients, in that countries tend to accumulate resources
over time and in that there is a level after which sudden stops would have no consequences on consumption.
However, in sharp contrast with his quantitative results, ours suggests that historically countries have not
gotten close to that level of savings. The main reason is the high opportunity cost of accumulating reserves
for these countries, which face two ﬁnancial constraints. On one hand, countries are unable to transfer
enough resources from the post- to the pre-development phase. On the other, within the pre-development
phase the country experiences sudden stops. The problem equivalent to that in Aiyagari is the buﬀer stock
built to smooth the sudden stop. The long run constraint, on the other hand, raises the opportunity cost of
such buﬀering.
Over recent years there has been a signiﬁcant rise in the volatility trades, including the VIX. The ﬁnance
literature has studied the impact of such trades on the performance of hedge funds and other markets
participants (see, e.g., Bondarenko (2004)). From a risk management perspective, the issues faced by these
5economic agents are similar to those faced by emerging market policymakers.
We setup the model in Section 2 while constraining the precautionary options of the country to the
accumulation of non-contingent reserves. In Section 3 we estimate the sudden stop process, quantify the
basic model, and assess the eﬀectiveness of reserves as a precautionary mechanism. In section 4 we let the
country purchase digital options from world capital markets. Section 5 implements the extended model
using the VIX as the contingent indicator on which options are written. Section 6 extends the results by
adding debt and discuss contingent liability management more broadly. Section 7 concludes and is followed
by several appendices.
2 Sudden Stops and Non-contingent Protection
While there are many important issues that arise from decentralization in economies with poor institutional
development, we leave these aside and focus on the problems between the country as a whole and international
investors. We study a representative agent economy with a benevolent government that seeks to maximize






with r being both the discount and riskless interest rate. While it is not essential, assuming a CRRA utility




2.1 Emerging Market Economies and World Capital Markets
There are two features of an emerging market economy that are important for our analysis. First, its current
income is low relative to its future income (it has yet to catch up), and thus it would like to borrow and run
current account deﬁcits. Second, it has diﬃculty pledging future income to ﬁnance these deﬁcits.
Let Yt represent the country’s income in the pre-development phase, and follow the geometric Brownian
motion:
dYt = µY Ytdt + σY YtdBt
with 0 ≤ µY <r .
Income post-development, on the other hand, is equal to:
κYt κ>1.
6A transition from the pre- to the post-development phase is irreversible and takes place at a random time
τG. The focus of the paper is on the former phase. In order to eliminate inessential time dependency, we
assume that τG is governed by a Poisson process with constant hazard g and independent of all other sources
of uncertainty in the model. Note that g(κ − 1) > 0 is the diﬀerence in the expected rate of growth of a
developing and a developed economy.
The swift transition and clear demarkation ensures that a country in the pre-development phase would
like to borrow against its post-development income. We split potential ﬁnanciers into world capital markets
at large (WCM, for short), and specialists. We focus on the former in this section and discuss specialists in
the next one.
World capital markets have limited connections and understanding of emerging market economies, hence
they do not accept contracts contingent on variables endogenous to these economies. For now, let them just
accept plain-vanilla debt. Moreover, they have only limited willingness to invest resources in any particular
emerging market economy. We shall assume that a country’s debt capacity with respect to WCM is capped
at some ﬁnite value Wt.
The country can also accumulate international assets. Both assets and liabilities pay a return of r per
unit of time. The constraint with respect to WCM applies to the country’s net assets, Xt:
Xt ≥− Wt.
Let us deﬁne reserves, Rt, to be the diﬀerence between debt capacity with respect to WCM and actual
net assets:
Rt = Wt + Xt
Note that if the country is at its debt capacity, then Xt = −Wt and reserves are 0. Similarly, if Wt =0then
reserves and net uncontingent assets coincide. By construction Rt ≥ 0. For now, we shall focus our attention
on the case
Wt =0
and relax this simpliﬁcation in Section 6. Until then, all borrowing will be done through specialists, which
will be introduced shortly in the next section.
Note that given our assumptions of a continuous sample path for the income process, a stable WCM
and, most importantly, a high expected growth, the country has no incentive to accumulate reserves. We
establish this as our benchmark result.





Then, starting from Rt =0 , the optimal solution is to keep Rt =0throughout and set Ct = Yt.





, then there are no reserves accumulation in the post-development phase. This result can only be
strengthened during the pre-development phase since there the expected growth rate is µY +g(κ−1) >µ Y .
Simply put, hoarding reserves during the pre-development phase is particularly costly for an emerging market,
primarily because the country as a whole is already constrained in its ability to transfer resources from the
post-development phase. This means that any accumulation of reserves in aggregate carries with it a costly
reduction in current consumption.
Henceforth we shall assume that condition 1 holds. This means that any accumulation of reserves will
have a source diﬀerent from the ingredients described up to now. We now turn to the role of specialists and
their risks.
2.2 Specialists and Sudden Stops
Specialists are investors that have developed some expertise and connections in the country and can engage
in more information-intensive contracts. Concretely, we capture this feature by allowing countries to sign
contracts with specialists that are contingent on country-speciﬁc variables. In particular, we let specialists
and countries write contracts contingent on the country’s transition to development. With this we capture
the idea that specialists big payoﬀs are closely tied to the country’s success. In practice, these contracts may
represent equity investment, FDI, the riskiest tranches of GDP-indexed bonds, or toxic-waste more generally.
Later on we also consider a richer set of contingent contracts that hedge the diﬀusive component of income,
but this we do for technical reasons and does not change the substantive message we isolate here.
Countries’ can pledge up to a share z of post-development output, κYs, for all s ≥ τG. In aggregate
–that is after netting out the multiple type of ﬁnancial contracts that individuals may sign and are not
of our concern in this paper – risk neutral specialists optimally engage in “swap-like” contracts with the
country. At each time t, the specialists commit to provide resources at a rate Ft over the next inﬁnitesimal
time interval dt, in exchange for receiving a promise to a stream of payments zκYt forever if development
¡
τG¢
arrives in the interval dt and 0 otherwise. By risk neutrality this stream is valued at zκYt/(r − µY ).
The maximum ﬂow that competitive specialists are willing to commit for the next dt is then:2
Ft = fYt
2Formally, this expression can be derived from the pricing equation:
rPt = −Ft + g(zκYt/(r − µY ) − Pt)
and noting that a swap at the time of its inception has value Pt =0 . Note that it would be trivial to add a markup to











This ensures that the funds provided by specialists before development are less than the unpledged income
after development. Thus, during non-sudden stop times, abbreviated as “NSS” and sometimes referred to
as “normal” times, an emerging market economy engages in as much swaps as it can:
fNSS
t = f
in order to smooth pre- and post-development consumption.
Let us now introduce the sudden stops, which are our main concern in this paper. Specialists help
completing ﬁnancial contracts and markets, but they can also experience shocks. We assume that there
are episodes when specialists’ ability to pledge resources is signiﬁcantly reduced. We neither specify the
particular agency problem or capital constraints that aﬄict specialists during sudden stops, nor let them
take precautionary measures against these. We simply state the aggregate constraint implied by these shocks
and focus on the country’s side of the problem:
Assumption 2 (Sudden Stops) During sudden stops, specialists (collectively) can commit at most ft < ft
resources to the country. Specialists transit from the normal to the sudden stop stage with hazard λ and do
the reverse with hazard ˜ λ, both of which are independent of the transition to development.
That is, the maximum ﬂow of resources received from the specialists before development drops to ftYt
during sudden stops, with
f < f
This tightening of the aggregate ﬁnancial constraint can be interpreted as a drop in the share of swaps rolled
over by the specialists, which are clearly binding:
fSS
t = f
For simplicity, we shall assume that if the country transits from the sudden stop to development, it transfers
the eﬀectively pledged resources fκz/g per unit time to specialists. Note that we could have assumed a
transfer of fκz/g, or anything in between, in which case not only the shadow but also the observed interest
rate would rise during sudden stops. This modiﬁcation is straightforward but not a ﬁrst order issue in our
analysis. More importantly, in the empirical section we associate the sudden stop to a period of prolonged
reduction in capital inﬂows; in practice this may come from a combination of an initial shock to specialists
9and a longer lasting decline in the country’s collateral z. This is straightforward to accommodate in the
model, with results analogous to attributing the entire episode to specialists’ problems, which is what we do
throughout.3













NSS =1 + f (3)
θ
SS =1 + f (4)
θ
G|NSS = κ − f(r − µY )/g (5)
θ
G|SS = κ − f(r − µY )/g (6)
where 1{NSS} and 1{SS} indicate whether the country is in normal times ("NSS"), or in a sudden stop




Finally, 1{G|SS},1{G|NSS} indicate that the country is currently developed and the transition to





The ﬁrst of these inequalities is important since it captures the constraint to transferring resources to the
emerging market (pre-development) phase. The second one is inessential, except for implicitly stating that
the former constraint binds regardless of whether the particular transition into development takes place from
NSS or SS.
Taking stock, we have that net assets accumulation is now described by:
dXt =( rXt − Ct + At)dt.
Let us conclude this section with two remarks. First, by introducing specialists we have eﬀectively
introduced short term borrowing whose availability can be reversed instantaneously in a manner that is
largely unrelated to country speciﬁc state variables, such as the level of debt. This captures an important
3Note, nonetheless, that we do need that specialists are a signiﬁcant part of the problem, otherwise we have to consider
additional insurance contracts between the country and its specialists.
10aspect of reality, especially for sudden stops that stem from contagion eﬀects (see, e.g., Calvo et al (2004)).
Second, we have managed to reduce the problem to one where the setup resembles closely a precautionary
savings model applied to the speciﬁc jump nature of sudden stops. Thus we can use standard and well
developed intuitions to analyze most of our results.
2.3 The Problem
We are now ready to study the reserves accumulation problem for an economy facing temporary shocks to
its specialists (sudden stops). Let us now collect the ingredients into the country’s optimization problem:
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˜ V (Xτ,Y τ)=V G|NSS(Xτ,Y τ)1{τ = τG} +1 {τ = τSS}V SS(Xτ,Y τ)
˜ V SS(Xτ,Y τ) ≡ V G|SS(Xτ,Y τ)1{τ = τG} + V (Xτ,Y τ)1{τ = τNSS}










dYt = µY Ytdt + σY YtdBt
Xt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
lim
t→∞e−rtXt =0
where V , V SS and V G denote the value functions in the states NSS, SS and G, respectively.
In words, in post-development (in the state G) the country faces a standard precautionary savings
problem. This state is absorbing, so that there can be no further transitions to the states "SS" or "NSS".
The ﬁrst (and ﬁnal) time that development arrives is denoted by τG, which occurs with hazard g.P r i o r
to development, the country can be either in a sudden stop "SS" or in normal times "NSS". Transitions
from normal times to sudden stops occur with a constant hazard rate of λ, at the stochastic times τSS. The
reverse transitions (from SS to NSS) occur at the rate e λ, at stochastic times τNSS.A s i d ef r o mt h ed i ﬀerent
potential transitions, the practical implication of being in any of the three regimes is that the maximum
amount of resources available diﬀers.
11Aside from the decision of how many growth-swaps to engage with specialists, which we have already
discussed and solved out of the problem, the country is faced with the decision of how much to consume (Ct).
Reserves play the role of providing the country with resources during sudden stops. However, accumulating
them is costly because the country is already constrained in normal times, since it cannot borrow to the full
extent against its post-development income.
While a full characterization of the solution to this problem has to wait until the quantitative section,
here we gauge the nature of the solution analytically.
Let us start backwards, from the post-development phase, where the problem is a conventional income-
ﬂuctuation problem. When not leading to confusion, we use the generic notation V G for both V G|SS and
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x − rvG (9)
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An immediate implication of this ﬁrst order condition is that the consumption to (potential) income ratio
is a function of the reserves to (potential) income ratio only.
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4For details see Duﬃe et al. (1997)
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It is instructive to study and compare the ﬁrst order conditions across the regions, in the (positive)






x (0) <v G|NSS
x (0) <v NSS
x (0) <v SS
x (0)
The last inequality implies that consumption drops at the sudden stop, while the next to last implies that
the country is not smoothing pre- and post-development consumption. It turns out that, as we show in the
next section, these features of the solution carry over to most of the empirically relevant range of reserves.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we estimate the main parameters of the model, calibrate others, and assess the optimal
reserves strategy quantitatively.
3.1 The Sudden Stop Process
T h ec o r eo fo u ra n a l y s i si st h es u d d e ns t o pp r o c e s s .I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ee s t i m a t et h em a i np a r a m e t e r so fs u c h
process: λ, e λ,a n dθ
SS/θ
NSS using data from 1983 to 2003 for six representative emerging market economies
(see the Appendix for selection criterion): Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand.
The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd empirical counterparts for the processes describing available resources during NSS
and SS. For this, we note that in the model these resources can be decomposed into income, Yt,a n dﬁnancial
ﬂows, (θt −1)Yt. In practice, there are several additional complexities in doing such a decomposition. These
stem from the existence of multiple goods whose relative prices change during the transitions between NSS
13and SS and viceversa, the presence of temporary terms of trade shocks, and endogenous domestic output
declines during sudden stops. The Data Appendix describes our methodology to deal with these issues. In
a nutshell, we approximate Yt with the permanent component of domestic national income, and (θt − 1)Yt
with the sum of capital ﬂows in terms of imported goods and the transitory component of exports and terms
of trade eﬀects. Our main left hand side variable is the ratio of these two, which can be loosely interpreted
as external ﬁnancing over “normal” pre-development income:




In our model, ψ can take only two values: (θ
NSS − 1) and (θ
SS − 1). Since this this is too stark a
characterization for actual data, we assume that that ψ is observed with (state contingent) noise,
e ψit = ψi(sit)+eit(sit)
with
eit(sit) ∼ N(0,σ2
e(sit)),s it ∈ {SS,NSS}.







e,i ,p i(NSS → SS),p i(SS → NSS)},s u c ht h a t :
pi(NSS → SS)=P r ( si,t+∆ = SS|si,t = NSS)=1− e−λi∆ (15)
pi(SS → NSS)=P r ( si,t+∆ = NSS|si,t = SS)=1− e−h λi∆ (16)
where we have approximated the continuous time model by its discrete analog assuming that there can be
at most one transition in a time interval of ∆.
For the calibration exercises we convert annual transition probabilities into annual frequencies by setting:
λ = −log[1 − P(NSS → SS)]
e λ = −log[1 − P(SS → NSS)]
Given the limited number of SS observations we have for each country and the highly nonlinear nature of
the hidden states model we are estimating, we use a Bayesian approach based on a Gibbs Sampler (see Kim
and Nelson 1999). We describe the precise procedure in the Appendix, but the main steps are as follows:
• We ﬁx arbitrary starting parameters.
• Conditional on these parameters, we ﬁlter the data using Hamilton’s algorithm to ﬁnd the posterior
probability that at a given point in time each country is in a SS or in NSS.
• We draw a sample path from this joint distribution. Such a path takes the value 1 if a given country
is in a SS and 0 otherwise.
14Average Std Dev 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
λ 0.19 0.050141 0.11337 0.15434 0.1868 0.22153 0.27772
e λ 0.14769 0.046718 0.079083 0.11403 0.14322 0.17685 0.23111
Table 1: Pooled Estimates using 1983-2003: Poisson Parameters.
• We condition on these paths (one for each country) and derive the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters. We require only that parameters related to pi(NSS → SS),p i(SS → NSS) are the same
across all countries, while the rest of the parameters can vary across countries. These parameters are
key for the quantitative exercises that follow, while they seem to be the hardest ones to measure based
on time series observations alone. Hence we exploit the cross sectional dimension of the panel in order
to increase the precision of these estimates. Throughout we use uninformative priors.
• Finally, we draw a new set of parameters from this posterior distribution and iterate the procedure
several thousand times. By standard results in Bayesian computation, the stationary distribution of
the sampled parameters coincides in law with the posterior distribution of the parameters.
Tables 1 and 2 present the estimates we obtain form this procedure for the parameters ψ
NSS






















Based on the medians, we conclude that sudden stops are large, leading to declines in available resources
typically beyond 10 percent, last for about 6.5 years years and occur about every 12 years (about 5.5 years
after exiting the previous sudden stop). As we said in the introduction, our measure of sudden stop is meant
to capture not only the initial spike in interest rates and turmoil but also the eﬀects of sudden stops that
remain even after the main event. Our estimates suggest that these eﬀects can be quite large: Countries
take a long time in resuming signiﬁcant borrowing after experiencing a severe capital ﬂow reversals.
Finally, Figure 2 summarizes the output of the corresponding Gibbs sampler run for our economies. It
illustrates the path of the share of economies with posterior probabilities of being in sudden stop above 0.5
during a given period. It is apparent from this ﬁgure that our procedure does capture the events one would
want it to capture when studying sudden stops.
5We also estimated for a sub-sample from the 1990s using quarterly data for a broader set of countries. The results were
very similar except for h λ, which were cut in half. However, this estimator is too aﬀe c t e db ye n do fs a m p l ec o n d i t i o ni nas h o r t
sample (if we trim the last two years, the estimates become very similar to those of the 1983-2003 sample that we report).
15Chile Average Std Dev 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
ψ
NSS 0.066 0.024 0.031 0.049 0.063 0.081 0.108
η -0.091 0.030 -0.132 -0.109 -0.094 -0.076 -0.041
Colombia
ψ
NSS 0.059 0.008 0.044 0.055 0.060 0.065 0.070
η -0.051 0.009 -0.064 -0.057 -0.052 -0.047 -0.036
Mexico
ψ
NSS 0.078 0.010 0.061 0.072 0.079 0.085 0.094
η -0.084 0.015 -0.106 -0.093 -0.085 -0.075 -0.059
Indonesia
ψ
NSS 0.043 0.006 0.033 0.039 0.043 0.047 0.053
η -0.066 0.009 -0.081 -0.072 -0.067 -0.061 -0.049
Malaysia
ψ
NSS 0.114 0.020 0.081 0.101 0.114 0.127 0.146
η -0.164 0.023 -0.199 -0.178 -0.164 -0.149 -0.126
Thailand
ψ
NSS 0.098 0.019 0.064 0.085 0.099 0.111 0.127
η -0.146 0.023 -0.179 -0.161 -0.147 -0.133 -0.107
Table 2: Country Speciﬁc Parameters 1983-2003: Normal Level of Resources and Sudden Stops.








































































































i and posterior probability of being in a SS for 6 diﬀerent countries.




































Figure 2: Fraction of Economies in SS
183.2 Other parameters
In addition to λ, e λ and θ
NSS/θ





before simulating the model. Within reasonable ranges, the choice of r, which represents both the interest
and the discount rate, is not of ﬁrst order importance; we simply set it to 0.04. The post-development growth
rate µY is set to 0.018, which is approximately the rate of growth of per-capita consumption in the US over
the very long sample considered in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). We set σY =0 .05, which is higher than
the developed economies volatility in national income because emerging markets also have signiﬁcant terms
of trade ﬂuctuations. The parameter g is set to 0.025, which matches the speed of convergence estimated by
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). We set θ
G|NSS/θ
NSS to 2, so that the expected rate of growth of income









which is on the conservative end of an emerging market economy’s expected growth during normal times.
The parameter θ
G|SS/θ
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r − (µY −
σ2
2
)xt − ct +1
¶
dt − σdBt
Let us deﬁne the "steady state" level of x as:
x∗ =m i n
x {(r − (µY −
σ2
2
))x − ct +1=0 }
Beyond this level, the process for xt has a negative drift and reserves start to decline on average. By
setting γ =8 ,w eo b t a i na nx∗ =0 .2, which is a reasonable estimate for the maximum desired level of
reserves for countries not attempting to use reserves accumulation with goals other than smoothing sudden
stops (such as maintaining an undervalued currency, and so on).
Finally, we use η = −0.1,ψ
NSS =0 .08 as a base case scenario in this section. These correspond roughly
to the median values of these parameters across the countries that we consider. The values for λ,e λ are
taken from the estimations of the previous section. Table 3 summarizes the values of the parameters used.
19γ 8 λ 0.211
δ 0.04 e λ 0.158
r 0.04 η -0.1
µ 0.018 g 0.025
σ 0.05 ψ 0.08
Table 3: Parameters used in Simulations.
3.3 Implications
Figure 3 depicts the policy functions. The upper curve represents consumption during NSS and the lower one
represents consumption during SS, both as a function of the level of reserves. The vertical distance between
these two curves illustrates the instantaneous drop in consumption once the country transits into SS.I nt h e
neighborhood of 0 this drop is largest and around 7.5%, and it declines as the level of reserves rises. Because
the drop is very large when the country has no reserves, precautionary savings is also maximum a this point,
which is reﬂected in the diﬀerence between one and cNSS.
Note that the policy functions cNSS(x) and cSS(x) do not converge. This is because, as we discussed in
the calibration section, once the country reaches x∗ =0 .2, it stops accumulating reserves. If reserves exceed
this level, the country rather consume them than use them to further smooth sudden stops. The opportunity
costs of reserves is simply to great to purse full insurance. Despite the large costs associated to sudden stops,
the strength of the other ﬁnancial constraint (the inability to pledge a signiﬁcant share of future, and higher,
income) raises the opportunity cost of storing reserves enough to make it (constrained) optimal to remain
somewhat unprotected against these sudden stops.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4, plot the paths of consumption and reserves, respectively, for a case where
the country starts with 0 reserves, then a sudden stop takes place exactly at its expected time, 1/λ,a n dt h e
sudden stop lasts exactly its expected time,1/e λ. For clarity, we also set dBt =0(in the path but not the
value and policy functions). Early on, the consumption path is increasing and below one, as the country
accumulates reserves, which it then uses during the sudden stop. The country’s incentive to accumulate
reserves is very steep initially and less intense once some reserves have been accumulated. Importantly,
even though the sudden stop in this example takes place exactly at its expected time, there is a signiﬁcant
consumption drop at the time of the sudden stop, reﬂecting the imperfect nature of the reserves accumulation
self-insurance mechanism.
The next two ﬁgures contain the distributions of the main quantities generated by the model, associated
to a large number of paths in our economy. Recall that randomness stems from Yt as well as from the
transitions in and out of sudden stops. We start with a country that has 0 reserves initially and simulate


























Figure 3: Consumption functions in NSS and SS

































Figure 4: Typical path of consumption and reserves.





















Figure 5: Distribution of Reserves immediately prior to SS.
5000 paths for T =8 0years, without a transition into development.
Figure 5 displays the histogram of reserves available at the point in which the country enters a sudden
stop. The possibility of a sudden stop leads to an accumulation of reserves well above 5% of available
resources during NSS. However it is critical to observe that there a signiﬁcant mass concentrated at very
low levels of reserves. This mass corresponds to those cases where the country has not had the time to
accumulate reserves since the previous sudden stop. These early crises are an important source of risk, that
reserves are particularly ineﬃcient in dealing with.6
Figure 6 displays average consumption during NSSand SS. The average diﬀerence between consumption
is large, around 7 percent. Moreover, often the country simply runs out of reserves during sudden stops and
consumption falls by the full extent of the capital ﬂow reversal.
In summary, these results raise the question of whether there are other ways to manage reserves that
6In practice, countries often deal with this risk by not using reserves very aggressively during sudden stops, which is a clearly
suboptimal strategy.





















Average Consumption during NSS





















Average Consumption during SS
Figure 6: Average consumption during SS and NSS.
24could increase their eﬃciency and avoid the risk that is associated with the unpredictability of sudden stops.
We turn to this question in the next section.
4 Contingent Instruments
In practice, how much better could countries do by holding contingent instruments in their reserves? Obvi-
ously, the answer to this question depends on the speciﬁc factors behind a country’s sudden stops and the
ﬁnancial markets available to hedge those speciﬁc factors. Our goal here is less ambitious. We simply want
to illustrate, in a conservative scenario in terms of information and ﬁnancial development requirements, the
signiﬁcant potential gains from improving current sudden-stop-risk-management practices by adding con-
tingent instruments that are largely independent of the country’s actions and, more generally, of factors
exclusively related to emerging markets (and hence not appealing to world capital markets).
4.1 Portfolio decision
Before introducing additional assets, let us develop in more detail the events behind a transition into a
sudden stop. It is useful to think of this transition in two steps. First, there is a Poisson process with
intensity χ that puts the economy in a “danger zone” at stochastic times τD. Second, at τD,t h ec o u n t r y
enters a sudden stop with probability P(SS =1 )and avoids it with probability P(SS =0 )=1−P(SS =1 ) .
It is evident that,
λ = χP(SS =1 ) (17)
and that nothing in our analysis up to now is modiﬁed by this decomposition of events.
Let us now assume that there is a ﬁnancial asset with payoﬀ Ft, that also has the potential to exhibit a
jump in “danger zones” τD, which we denote by J.W h e nJ =1the asset’s payoﬀ exhibit a jump at τD,
while J =0denotes the absence of a jump at such time. Correspondingly, the probability of each event
(conditional on τD) are denoted by P(J =1 )and P(J =0 ) , respectively. It follows that this jump process
also follows a Poisson process with intensity:
λJ ≡ χP(J =1 ) (18)
Note that sofar we have not excluded the possibility that the jump in the asset with payoﬀ Ft is inde-
pendent from the transition into the SS (P(J =1 ,SS=1 )=0 ) ), although clearly our interest is in the case
where:
P(J =1 ,SS=1 )> 0
We can now write the risky asset’s payoﬀ process as:





25where dNt is a jump process that takes the value of one at time τD and zero otherwise, and J = P(J =1 )
is the mean of J. Correspondingly, the asset has a return dFt
Ft .
In what follows we condition on those times τD w h e r ew eo b s e r v eeither aj u m p(J =1 ) and/or a
transition into SS. This is without loss of generality, since (as we show shortly) the Bellman equation only
depends on those events and not on situations where neither takes place. Hence from now on let us deﬁne:
χ∗ = χ(1 − P(SS =0 ,J =0 ) )
which is the hazard rate for observing either a jump in J or a transition into SS. An obvious corollary
is that there are only three possible outcomes that can take place at those times (SS =1 ,J =1 ) , or
(SS =0 ,J =1 ), or (SS =1 ,J =0 ). To simplify notation let us deﬁne:
pJ=1,SS=1 = P(SS =1and J =1 |SS =1or J =1 )
pSS=1,J=0 = P(SS =1and J =0 |SS =1or J =1 )
pJ=1,SS=0 = P(SS =0and J =1 |SS =1or J =1 )
To complete the description of the data generating process we assume that once in a sudden stop, the
transition out of it, which happens with intensity e λ, is independent of the jumps in J.
The addition of a risky asset with the above properties modiﬁes the analysis in only two respects. First
the evolution of reserves (7) becomes
dXt =( r(Xt − ξtFt) − Ct + At)dt + ξtdFt
where ξt is the amount invested in the risky asset Ft. It is important to note that the constraint Xt ≥ 0,
implies the “short selling” constraint
ξt ≥− Xt/max(J).
Else, there could be case, where the jump is suﬃciently large to violate the non-negativity constraint on Xt.
If max(J)=1( a sw eh a v ea s s u m e d )w eh a v et h ep o r t f o l i oc o n s t r a i n t :ξt/Xt ≥− 1. This means that the
risky asset cannot be used to circumvent the borrowing constraint (i.e., it must post full margin).
Second, the optimization problem now involves a portfolio decision. This decision is straightforward in
the post-development and sudden stops regions since investing in the asset Ft only means adding risk to the
country’s reserves holdings, without reward in terms of hedging value. Accordingly, the country picks ξt =0
in these regions and the associated Bellman equations of section 2.3 remain unchanged.
Thus the portfolio decision is interesting only in the pre-development non-sudden-stop region (NSS),
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where the expectation is taken at time τD but without knowledge of which of the three possible combinations
of J and SS is about to materialize.
In the extreme case where pJ=1,SS=1 =1 , the country has an "ideal" instrument at its disposal and the
Euler equation collapses to:
u0(CτD+)=u0(CτD−)
which implies CτD+ = CτD− and hence there is no consumption drop upon entering a SS. Moreover, one
can show that in this case the country has no incentive to accumulate reserves and instead just purchases
enough contingent instruments to ensure that CτD+ = CτD−.
More generally, both pJ=0,SS=1 and pJ=1,SS=0 are positive, which implies that there can be signiﬁcant
injections of resources that do not come with sudden stops, as well as sudden stops with signiﬁcant con-
sumption drops since the contingent strategy does not yield the resources in a timely manner. In this case,
the Euler equation simply balances the risks of these events. Doing so generally requires accumulating
non-contingent and contingent reserves, an issue we return to in the empirical implementation below.
7In the second line pJ=0,SS=0 =0since we condition on events where either J =1or SS =1 .
274.2 Implementation
The strategy described above assumes that the country and the world capital markets can write a contract
that is contingent on a jump in the price of a traded asset. It is not immediately obvious how to write such
a contract. In this section we describe a practical way to create a contract that pays 1 if a traded asset
exhibits a jump and 0 otherwise. Assume that there exists a state variable with dynamics:
dwt = µwdt + σwdBt + JwdNt
and that there exist call and put options that are written on this state variable. Fix ﬁrst ∆,ε,ε 1 > 0 and
assume that the country goes long a call option with exercise price wt + σw
√
∆ + ε and short a call option
with strike price wt+σw
√
∆+ε+ε1. Such a scheme pays ε1 if wt+∆ >w t +σw
√
∆+ε+ε1 and 0 if wt+∆ <
wt + σw
√
∆ + ε. Now suppose that it can be repeated N times, so that ε1 → 0 and Nε1 → 1. Then, one
obtains in the limit a “digital” option that pays 1 if wt+∆ >w t +σw
√
∆+ε, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore
assume that we take ∆ to 0, by considering contracts of very small maturity. Then we have a contract that
pays 1 if wt+− wt− >ε ,i.e. if wt exhibits a discontinuity larger than ε. If the distribution of Jw has a
positive lower bound then taking ε to be that lower bound yields a contract that has a payoﬀ of 1 if there is
aj u m pa n d0 otherwise.8 The payoﬀ of such a strategy would then be equivalent to the payoﬀ of an asset
following the process in equation (19) and the analysis of the previous section follows.
It is important to note that the above argument is an approximation argument. We obtain a contract
that delivers a payoﬀ conditional on a jump as the limit of trading strategies with existing securities. From
a practical perspective, creating a payoﬀ that resembles a digital option from puts and calls is relatively
straightforward. Investment banks are often willing to provide quotes for such contracts directly. The more
subtle part of the argument is the limit as ∆ → 0. In the econometric estimations that follow we therefore
estimate the “correlation” between a contract that would have a payoﬀ of 1 if wt+∆ − wt is larger than a
ﬁxed amount ε,a n d∆ is taken to be a month.
5 Quantitative Analysis
Our goal here is not to conduct a thorough search for the optimal risky instrument for speciﬁcc o u n t r i e s ’
portfolios. Rather, we seek to illustrate the kind of properties that such instruments ought to have and their
implications. With this purpose, we chose the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). This is a traded index formed
from quoted put and call options on the S&P 500, available since the late 1980s. This index extracts the
“implied” volatility from the underlying options. Traders then can take positions in this index to implement
8If the distribution of the jump has no lower bound then we can still obtain a payoﬀ similar to the above with high enough
probability as long as we set the "cutoﬀ" ε low enough and Pr(ζw >ε ) is close to 1.
28hedges or speculate. In line with the model, this index is primarily driven by US and not emerging market
events. Moreover, as we show below, sudden stops are highly correlated with jumps in the VIX. These two
properties are key for useful and potentially liquid SS-hedging instruments.
5.1 The VIX Process
Let us postulate a continuous time process of the VIX, described by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck with jumps:




Notice that this process is of the form considered in section 4.2. The ﬁrst term captures the predictable
component of the process, which plays no interesting role in what follows. For simplicity we shall take
A,B,σVIX to be constant and φ to be a normal distribution with mean µφ and standard deviation σφ.T h e
jump process dNt takes the value 1 when a jump takes place and 0 otherwise. The parameter λJ denotes the
hazard rate for the jump process. Finally, note that the second and third terms in the process are martingale
diﬀerences.
In estimation, we shall approximate the above process by its discrete time counterpart. The ﬁrst step is
to remove the predictable component, for which we estimate an AR(1) process for log(VIX) and focus on
the residuals. These residuals are characterized by a mixture of normals:
et = µVIX∆ + σVIX
√
∆εt+∆ + φt+∆1{J =1 } (21)
with µVIX ≈− λJµφ∆ and 1{J =1 } denotes an indicator that takes the value 1 if a jump takes place



















The source of the approximation to the continuous time limit, is that the discrete approximation excludes
the possibility of more than one jump in the interval ∆, which seems reasonable if we want to focus on
relatively large and infrequent jumps and relatively small time intervals ∆.
Note that (21) can be rewritten as:




with pVIX =1− e−λJ∆.
In principle, estimation can proceed from this point on along conventional jump-diﬀusion estimation
(see, e.g., Caballero and Panageas (2004)). Instead of following this path, we adopt a strategy that is more
29directly linked to the implementation strategy described in section 4.2.9 We assume that the country can
obtain contracts that pay oﬀ 1 unit if the residual from the log(VIX) AR1-regression is above 0.259.T h i s
is the cutoﬀ that ensures that the type I error of wrongly accepting an observation as a jump is less than
1% (see the appendix):
Pr(et > 0.259|J =0 )< 0.01
Note that this rule clearly selects the jumps, but there is some residual Type I error associated with the
diﬀusion component of et.
Figure 7 shows the residuals of an an AR(1) model for log(VIX). The shaded areas represents those
instances when this statistic is above 0.259. The VIX exhibits signiﬁcant jumps in the early 90’s (at the
onset of the gulf war) in 1997 (around the Asian crisis), in 1998 (around the Russian/LTCM crisis), after
9/11/2001, and around the beginning of the U.S. corporate scandals and the Argentinean default.
This procedure gives us estimates of the times when the (AR1 residuals of the) VIX experience jumps.
With these estimates we turn next to determining the joint occurrence of jumps and transitions into SS for
the various countries.
5.2 Conditional Probabilities
The ﬁnal step to be able to assess the beneﬁts of hedging, is to ﬁnd an estimate of the degree of “correlation”
between jumps in the VIX and transitions into SS.




, as described in detail in the appendix. In essence, we start by marking the dates associated with jumps
in the VIX as determined above. Eﬀectively we are conditioning on this information. We then use the
paths associated with the repetitions of the Gibbs sampler to identify the dates in which individual countries
entered into a SS (applying the parameters estimated for the long annual sample on quarterly data for the
1990s). Second, we update the (uniform - uninformative) prior by counting the number of times that the
VIX jumps and the country transits from an NSS state into an SS state. We pool all countries together as
in section 3.1 in order to exploit the cross sectional dimension of the panel. Third, we condition on the NSS
states and count the total number of jumps in the VIX during such states. This allows us to update the
probability that within each quarter the VIX jumps (we denote this probability as P(J)). We also count
the number of times that a given country transits into SS. Fourth, we obtain a (beta) posterior distribution
for P(SS|J) and P(J) from which we take a separate draw for each repetition of the sampler. To check
9If anything, this procedure is biasing the results towards ﬁnding a lower "correlation", because it introduces the potential




VIX Residuals and Jumps











Figure 7: VIX residuals. The grey areas correspond to instances where the VIX residual is above the
jump-cutoﬀ.
31Average Std Dev 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Beta 0.159 0.032 0.109 0.137 0.158 0.180 0.215
Empirical 0.155 0.006 0.145 0.151 0.155 0.159 0.163
Table 4: Pr(J) Pooled Estimator, quarterly data 1990-2003. Bayesian Updating and Empirical Distribution.
Average Std Dev 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Beta 0.236 0.096 0.095 0.165 0.226 0.296 0.413
Empirical 0.211 0.040 0.150 0.190 0.200 0.238 0.286
Table 5: Pr(SS|J) Pooled Estimator, quarterly data 1990-2003. Bayesian Updating and Empirical Distri-
bution.
the inﬂuence of this prior on our estimates we also report directly the distribution of the ratio of joint
occurrences (NSS → SS =1and J =1 )to total occurrences (NSS → SS =1or J =1 ) . Similarly, we also
report the distribution of the ratio of total occurrences of jumps only (J =1 )to total occurrences of either
event(NSS → SS =1or J =1 ). We label this the "empirical" distribution.
In tables 4 and 5 we report the results of this estimation. Table 4 contains the estimates for P(J)
and table 5 contains estimates for P(SS|J). The top line in both tables includes statistics for the posterior
distribution obtained through the formal Bayesian procedure described above. The bottom line contains
the “empirica” distribution, which is only given for an intuitive “robustness” check on the inﬂuence of the
uniform prior on the posterior location parameters like the mean and the median.
From this table one can obtain the implied intensity of a jump in the VIX as:
λJ = −4log(1− P(J)) = 0.69
where P(J) denotes the mean of the posterior distribution of P(J).
Now we can identify all the key parameters of the joint VIX and SS process, which can be recovered from
the following four relations:
λJ ≡ χ∗ (pJ=1,SS=1 + pJ=1,SS=0) (23)




1=pJ=1,SS=1 + pJ=1,SS=0 + pSS=1,J=0 (24)
Since we have obtained estimates for λJ,λ(from section 3.1) and Pr(SS|J) from the above table, we
32γ 8 λ 0.211 Pr(SS =1and J =1 ) 0.221
δ 0.04 e λ 0.148 Pr(SS =1and J =0 ) 0.063
r 0.04 η (0.07,0.1,0.14) Pr(SS =0and J =1 ) 0.716
µ 0.018 g 0.025 χ∗ 0.743
σ 0.05 λJ 0.696
Table 6: Parameters used in Simulations.
Average Std Dev 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Beta 0.636 0.16122 0.354 0.526 0.645 0.759 0.883
Empirical 0.672 0.088 0.556 0.625 0.667 0.714 0.857
Table 7: Pr(J|SS) Pooled Estimator, quarterly data 1990-2003. Bayesian Updating and Empirical Distri-
bution.
can solve for the four unknowns pJ=1,SS=1,p SS=1,J=0,p J=1,SS=0 and χ∗. Table 6 summarizes the resulting
parameters that we use in the simulation in the next section.
Finally, we also obtain estimates Pr(J|SS), which report in Table 7. They indicate that the probability
of observing a “jump” conditional on a transition to SS is about 70 percent. Which means that with very
high probability the contract that we consider delivers payoﬀs exactly in the states where inﬂows are needed
the most.
5.2.1 Implications
In this section we calibrate the model with the same parameters as the ones used in section 3.2. To provide
a base case scenario we use the median pJ,SS. Using the same λ as in section 3.2 and the λJ obtained in
5.1 we can determine χ∗, pSS=1,J=0 and pJ=1,SS=0 from the procedure described above and solve the model
numerically.
For the same realizations in section 3.2, plus the corresponding realizations of simulated VIX processes,
panel (a) in Figure 8 reports the diﬀerence in reserves at the time of the sudden stop between the contin-
gent and non-contingent strategies, normalized by the average of the latter. The empirical mean of this
distribution is close to 30 percent. This is a direct consequence of the eﬃciency of hedging compared to
non-contingent reserve accumulation. By adopting the optimal hedging strategy the country manages to
transfer more resources towards the states it is concerned with, namely the onset of a SS.
However, the above distribution and its mean underestimates the beneﬁts of hedging. It is apparent that
it is much worse to have less reserves when there is little of them to start with (which is when the hedging
strategy typically dominates by a wide margin), than to have fewer reserves when the country has had plenty
























































Figure 8: Reserves Gain (in absolute and proportional terms)























Figure 9: Diﬀerence in the magnitude of consumption drop upon entering the SS
35η =0 .1 η =0 .14 η =0 .07
Mean Level of Reserves 0.065 0.137 0.019
Median Level of Reserves 0.064 0.132 0.019
Mean Reserves (ﬁrst quartile) 0.011 0.022 0.0034
Mean Reserves (fourth quartile) 0.122 0.263 0.0356
Median (normalized) reserves gain 0.293 0.047 1.658
Median (normalized) reserves gain (ﬁrst quartile) 2.797 1.265 9.422
Median (normalized) reserves gain (fourth quartile) -0.058 -0.130 0.801
Absolute value of Median diﬀerence in consumption drop 0.010 0.010 0.022
Absolute Value of Median diﬀerence (75th Percentile) 0.015 0.013 0.027
Absolute Value of Median diﬀerence (25th Percentile) 0.007 0.006 0.015
Median Portfolio 0.700 0.562 0.776
Table 8: Performance of hedging strategies
of time to prepare for the sudden stop (which is when the unhedged strategy may do better). To capture





This expression gives the relative reserves gain. As might be expected the distribution of ∆xR is right skewed.
The hedge performs especially well when the country has not had the time to accumulate non-contingent
reserves. An alternative way of making the same point is seen in the ﬁrst column of Table 8 (η =0 .1), for
the row labelled “median (normalized) gain (ﬁrst quartile)," which shows that the median gain from the
contingent strategy when reserves are low is close to 300 percent (since the mean of reserves is 0.011, this
implies an absolute gain in reserves around 3 percent of θ
NSSY ).
In terms of the drop of consumption at the instant of the sudden stop, the above diﬀerence translate into
am e d i a nd i ﬀerence that exceeds 1 percent of maximum NSS-consumption and, as shown in Figure 9, has
signiﬁcant mass at drop-diﬀerentials four times as large as that.
Figure 10 displays the notional amount of contingent contracts normalized by reserves as a function of
xt. Two observations emerge from this ﬁgure: First, as a percentage of xt, the amount invested in contingent
contracts declines. Second, the country enters a large number of these contracts. For instance when x =0 .05,
the country enters contracts that equal total reserves. And when x is as large as 0.15, the contracts still
exceed 30 percent of reserves.
In terms of dynamics, these two observations mean that the country should ﬁrst build the contingent
part of the portfolio aggressively, adding non-contingent reserves only gradually. The reason for this strategy



















Figure 10: Notional amount invested in contingent instruments normalized by reserves.
37is that the country is particularly concerned about the worst possible event. That is, is to be found without
resources at the time of a sudden stop. When the stock of reserves is small, the best chance of avoiding
this worst-event is by getting a large contingent payment at the time of the sudden stop. When the stock
of reserves is large, the worst-event is more likely to take place if the country overcommits to contingent
contracts and these do not deliver, than by holding a large amount of non-contingent reserves.
These features also have implications across diﬀerent conﬁgurations of parameters. Going back to Table
8, the columns report results for three scenarios that only vary in the size of the sudden stop. In addition
to the benchmark scenario, we report results for the 25 and 75 percentiles of our estimated ηs. The results
suggest that as countries improve along dimensions that reduce the size of sudden stop,10 they should not only
reduce their reserves accumulation but also reallocate their portfolios toward more contingent instruments.
6 Debt and Contingent Liability Management
Let us now relax the constraint W =0and allow the country to borrow from WCM, so that:
Xt ≥− Wt a.s.
for some process Wt > 0. This mean that net assets with WCM as the counterparty (Xt) can potentially
turn negative. In principle Wt could be any process. However, it is most reasonable to assume that Wt is
proportional to income:
Xt ≥− wYt (25)
The point of this short section is that the essence of our analysis of reserves remains valid here, now for
net assets (or liabilities) management.
In fact, without further modiﬁcations the analysis is identical to that in the previous sections since the
country would behave as if w =0 . The reason for this is that for any Xt < 0, there is a path of the diﬀusion
in income that would lead to negative consumption. The standard approach to remove this unpleasant




where dBt is the same Brownian motion that drives the income process.11
By adding this asset to its portfolio, the country removes the possibility of a perverse path and is now
willing to borrow from WCM.12
10For example, the estimate of η we report for Chile corresponds to an average of 0.11 and 0.08 for the 1980s and 1990s,
respectively.
11See Duﬃe and Huang (1986).
12We view the introduction of this asset as a technical device to make the substantive point we wish to address here rather
38Rt = Xt + wYt ≥ 0
The presence of S in the country’s portfolio allows it to eﬀectively remove the diﬀusion component of the
income process but this changes in no substantive way our analysis. In particular, if there are no sudden
stops, and if w is not too large, the country never wants to increase X. But, more importantly, if there are
sudden stops, it is optimal for the country to rely on contingent instruments correlated to the sudden stops
rather than just on ex-ante slack in the constraint 25.
In summary, the implications and recommendations stemming from our analysis carry beyond the problem
of reserves management to that of external assets and liability management. A country that experiences
sudden stops beneﬁts from indexing its assets and liabilities to variables that are correlated with these sudden
stops. Public debt, for example, should have coupons and principal that fall as the VIX (or similar variables)
crosses certain critical thresholds.
7F i n a l R e m a r k s
Emerging market economies hold levels of international reserves that greatly exceed the levels held by
developed economies (relative to their size). This would seem paradoxical given that, unlike the latter, the
former face signiﬁcant ﬁnancial constraints with much of their growth ahead of them. The paradox disappears
once these greater ﬁnancial constraints also become an important source of volatility, which countries seek
to smooth. This is the context we have modelled, analyzed, and began to assess quantitatively.
Once such perspective is adopted, one must ask whether current practices, consisting primarily in accu-
mulating non-contingent reserves, are the best countries can or should aim to do. How eﬀective are reserves
in smoothing the impact of sudden stops unrelated to a country’s actions? How much of them should be
accumulated? How fast? Are there potentially less costly ﬁnancial mechanisms to deal with capital ﬂow
volatility? Who would be the natural counterpart for these mechanisms? How are these mechanisms limited
by ﬁnancial and collateral constraints?
Our framework provides aspects of an answer to each of these questions: Even if optimally managed,
reserves oﬀer limited insurance, should be accumulated at a slower pace and used more aggressively during
sudden stops, than is being done by prudent emerging market economies. However, the most important
than as a claim that such assets exist in reality. An alternative mechanism to make the same substantive point, is simply to
assume that there is a lower bound for Y . One of the main reasons the literature prefers the somewhat artiﬁcial “complete
markets” solution is that in such case one can use the very general methods of El Karoui and Jeanblanc Pique (1998), and He and
Pages (1993) to solve the country’s post-development problem. As El Karoui and Jeanblanc Pique (1998) demonstrate, solving
problems of this kind amounts to solving the complete markets problem and subtracting the value of a perpetual American
option on the diﬀerence between the constraint-free net asset process and the constraint.
39message of the paper is that there are potential insurance contracts, credit lines and hedging markets,
that could signiﬁcantly reduce the cost and improve the eﬃciency of mechanisms to smooth sudden stops.
The natural counterpart of these instruments and contracts are not the regular emerging market specialist
investors but the world capital markets at large. This is an important consideration to have in mind when
designing such instruments. The much touted GDP-indexed and peso-bonds, for example, while a natural
and useful instrument to trade with specialists (in fact, they do in our model) are unlikely to appeal to the
broad markets. Non-contingent reserves have a place as well, since in practice hedges are unlikely to be
perfect, and overcommitting to an imperfect hedge comes with its own risks. It is clear, nonetheless, that
there are enough veriﬁable and contractible global variables that are signiﬁcantly correlated with sudden
stops and should form the basis for a better contingent strategy. Importantly, the very same ﬁnancial
constraints that are behind these countries’ troubles, limit the type and amount of insurance and hedging
strategies these countries can engage in. In particular, since sudden stops are mostly times when specialists
are constrained as well, the strategies must be such that require little credibility and commitment on the
country side. This means, essentially, policies and investments that are paid (or collateralized) up-front
rather than simple swaps of future contingencies.
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Nominal Exports (PXX) World Development Indicators and IFS
(local currency) (quarterly and annual)
Nominal Imports (PMM) World Development Indicators and IFS
(local currency) (quarterly and annual)
Real Exports (X) World Development Indicators
(local currency) (annual)
Real Imports (M) World Development Indicators
(local currency) (annual)
Nominal Capital Flows (CF) IFS
(dollars) (quarterly and annual)
Nominal Exchange Rate (E) World Development Indicators and IFS
(quarterly and annual)
Net Factor Payments (NFP) IFS
(dollars) (annual)
Table 9: Data used in the construction of ψ.
8A p p e n d i x
AD a t a
The Data
The VIX is publicly available from the CBOE on a daily frequency. For an introduction to the construction
of this index, see CBOE (2003). We used a monthly frequency in order to smooth spurious daily volatility.
For the construction of ψit, we used data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database,
and from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Table 9 presents a list
of the variables and corresponding sources.
While in the model ψ is straightforward, in the data its computation is more cumbersome since there are
multiple goods, exchange rate ﬂuctuations, intermediate goods, and so on. All our steps below are aimed at


















where N and X correspond to real nontradables and exports; PX and PM to export and import prices in
local currency; and E and CF to the nominal exchange rate and capital ﬂows.




(GDPt − (PX,t − 0.5PM,t)Xt)
where GDP is the country’s GDP, PN,t is the price of nontradables approximated by the local CPI,





captures the terms of trade eﬀect.
We decompose between trends and cycles using a standard Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter; extending the series
as much as we could in order to reduce the eﬀect of the end-of-series bias in this procedure. We applied the
ﬁlter the log of the corresponding variable.
In summary, the denominator in equation (26) measures the average (trend level) of total income and
resources, while the numerator attempts to capture the cyclical component of external resources.
The Sample
We work with a sample of six developing countries/emerging markets: Chile, Colombia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey. We chose them from the list of countries in Calvo, Izquierdo
and Mejia (2004) plus Malaysia. However, since their sample is for the 1990s only andwe needed a longer
time series dimension (we used data from 1983 to 2003), we dropped all the countries that either were closed
during the 1980s, or had primarily domestic macroeconomic problems, or did not have complete data. Our
marginal drop was Korea, for which we did not have good deﬂators. However, when we re-estimated our
model with Korea included (using only capital ﬂows data divided by nominal GDP for Korea ), our results
remained essentially unchanged.
We made one adjustment to our construction of e ψit. In the case of Chile, the cycle around the debt
crisis is signiﬁcantly larger than that of the 1990s. Thus in a ﬁrst stage we standardized the 1980s and
1990s in order to estimate the hidden-states and the transition probabilities. After that, we inverted the
standardization to recover the means of each state in each sub-sample.
Finally, we constructed quarterly series for e ψit using a related series approach with quarterly data on
capital ﬂows. We restrict the average of the quarterly values to be equal to the annual ﬁgure we computed
directly using equation (26). Unfortunately, we lack quarterly data for the capital ﬂows for all countries in
the 1990-2003 period. To solve this problem we use a linear (or a quadratic) interpolation method to obtain
42quarterly series for the years when we lack quarterly data. Although the point estimates do not change
much if we only use interpolation methods, the timing of the event matters for the synchronization between
sudden stops and the VIX, so we use as much information from the quarterly capital ﬂows as possible in
order to preserve the timing of the joint events. We use interpolation methods for the following countries
(dates are shown in parenthesis): Chile (1990), Colombia (1990-1995), and Malaysia (1990-1998).
Reserves
As a reference, the next table shows reserves, reserves net of short term, and total external liabilities for
the six economies we study.
B Details on the econometric procedure of Sections 3.1, 5.1, 5.2.
Section 3.1: To estimate the process described in this section we apply a Bayesian methodology, by using a
Gibbs Sampler. The Gibbs Sampler is by now a standard methodology in estimating models involving hidden
states (See Kim and Nelson (1999) for an introductory treatment). The basic idea is to exploit knowledge
about the conditional distribution of one parameter at a time (ﬁxing all the others) to construct the joint
posterior distribution of all parameters.
We modify the basic model that Kim and Nelson (1999) present by pooling all the countries into a
single sample. We allow all parameters of the model to diﬀer across countries. However, in order to obtain
precise estimates we assume that the transition probabilities into and out of a sudden stop are the same
across countries. Moreover, we assume that the joint probability of a jump in the VIX and a simultaneous
transition into a sudden stop is common across countries.









p(NSS → SS),p (SS → NSS) } and then determine the posterior probabilities that a particular realization
of e ψit was drawn from the ﬁrst (NSS)or the second (SS) distribution. To do that we run a standard
Hamilton (1989,1990) type ﬁlter as described in Kim and Nelson (1999). This allows us to determine
a sequence of posterior probabilities that a given realization of the data was drawn from the second (SS)
normal distribution. We repeat this process for each country separately and obtain one sequence per country.
We shall denote this as Pr(SS =1 |e ψi;Φ). In the next step we draw an (artiﬁcial) sample of 1’s and 0’s from
these posterior probabilities. We use the convention that 1 corresponds to a Sudden Stop and 0 to NSS.
In the next step we take these 1’s and 0’s as given. Eﬀectively this allows us to proceed as if we knew
whether each economy is in SS or not at a given point in time. Then we use this information to determine
the posterior distributions of the elements of Φ. Once again we do this in steps as described in Kim and









ﬁrst: To facilitate the updating we use conjugate priors: a) a beta prior for p(NSS → SS),p (SS → NSS)
43Res Res Res - ST Debt Total Ext
- ST Debt + Priv Res Debt
Chile Avg 20.6% 15.3% 15.0% 46.5%
Median 21.5% 16.3% 12.6% 45.7%
Max 22.7% 21.0% 29.1% 63.4%
Min 15.4% 4.3% -5.0% 30.3%
Colombia Avg 11.3% 6.1% 1.5% 36.6%
Median 10.0% 6.5% 2.1% 39.1%
Max 16.6% 10.8% 6.4% 44.9%
Min 8.4% 2.4% -3.2% 27.1%
Mexico Avg 5.5% 0.1% -6.5% 28.8%
Median 5.6% 0.2% -6.7% 25.6%
Max 7.2% 3.6% 2.3% 43.4%
Min 2.7% -4.9% -18.6% 20.4%
Indonesia Avg 11.3% 7.1% 6.9% 22.5%
Median 7.4% 4.8% 4.7% 17.4%
Max 19.8% 15.8% 17.4% 44.4%
Min 4.7% 1.9% -0.7% 13.3%
Malaysia Avg 29.4% -4.8% -9.1% 187.7%
Median 28.6% -7.7% -12.1% 186.2%
Max 42.3% 24.3% 24.6% 237.2%
Min 19.6% -25.6% -35.9% 147.4%
Thailand Avg 21.3% 3.6% -7.8% 56.4%
Median 20.8% 3.3% -3.7% 58.2%
Max 28.0% 18.6% 21.9% 93.8%
Min 14.1% -6.8% -36.1% 32.9%
Table 10: Debt and Reserves: 1990-2002 (% of GDP) Res: Total Reserves minus Gold; ST Debt: Short-term
External Debt; Priv Res: Net Private Reserves.
44with α = β =1which coincides with a uniform prior on [0,1] b) an (improper) normal prior for ψ
NSS
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¢2 that lead to posteriors that depend only on the data









¢2 as explained in Kim and Nelson (1999). Finally, we assume that all priors are
independent of each other. By well known results in Bayesian Statistics the posterior distributions are in the
same class as these conjugate priors. Moreover there are simple closed form expressions for the parameters
of the posterior distributions. This allows us to determine the posterior distribution of the parameters for
each country separately. In the spirit of the Gibbs Sampler, when we update the posterior probabilities one
at a time (i.e. keeping all parameters except one ﬁxed). Finally, once we have determined the posterior
distribution of each parameter, we make a random draw from that distribution and keep that number ﬁxed
until the next iteration of the sampler.
The updating of p(NSS → SS),and p(SS → NSS) is done by pooling the observations for all the
countries. So, for each country we count the number of transitions to and out of sudden stops, and the total
number of periods in normal times and in sudden stops. We then add all the episodes for all countries and
ﬁnd the posterior distributions as follows













i is the number of observations marked as normal years that are followed by a year marked as
sudden stop. We shall refer to this as a transition to a sudden stop.C o n v e r s e l y , aNSS
i counts the times
that a normal year is followed by another normal year (NSS). This count is done country by country, but
then we add all them up into a single number which is used in the updating process. Let us emphasize that
this approach exploits the panel dimension of the data in order to obtain precise estimates of the transition
probabilities.
Similarly, the posterior for the other parameter in the transition matrix is given by the following formula













i is the number of observations marked as sudden stops that are followed by a year marked as
"normal". Conversely, bSS
i represents the other case, which is when a transition out of a sudden stop does
not occur.
We conclude by making a random draw from these distributions too.









e,i } and c) the "pooled estimates" of p(NSS → SS),and p(SS →
NSS) . Then we repeat the above procedure several times and at each time we record the new draw of
the paths of 1’s and 0’s for each country and the parameters. By properties of the Gibbs sampler, the
45posterior distribution of these random draws coincides in law with the posterior (joint) distribution of all
the parameters (and the hidden states).
Section 5.1: In order to choose the cutoﬀ point x we proceeded as follows. First, we estimate an AR(1)
process for log(VIX) and focus on the residuals zt, which -according to the model- follow approximately a
mixture of normals. Second we estimate a mixture of normals distribution for zt. Having an estimate of the
pVIX,µ VIX,σ 2
VIX,µ φ,σ 2
φ, we then proceed to determine the cutoﬀ in the same way that one would proceed
in hypothesis testing. Namely, given our estimate of µVIX,σ 2
VIX we set the threshold x high enough so
that:
P(zt >x |J =0 )< 1%
In statistical terms this would correspond to the "size" of a test that would (wrongly) accept the hypoth-
esis of a jump with probability less than 1%. Also, with the value of x in hand, we can identify the months
when the VIXactually crossed the threshold and we label them as jumps.
Let us reiterate that we adopt this procedure in order to be able to assess the performance of realistic
hedging contracts. We also tried an alternative approach in order to determine λJ and pJ,SS jointly: We
ran a Gibbs Sampler to determine pVIX,µ VIX,σ 2
VIX,µ φ,σ 2
φ and the posterior probability of a jump in
zt. Subsequently we used the estimate of pVIX to determine λJ. In a next step we sampled (jointly) from
the posterior distribution of the states of e ψi in section 3.1 and the posterior probabilities of a jump in the
VIX to determine pJ,SS. Under either procedure we obtained similar results. We adopt the ﬁrst procedure
because it is the more conservative of the two and is closer to how such contracts would be implemented in
practice.
Section 5.2: By using the cutoﬀ value for the VIXwe also determine the months in which we observed a
jump in the VIX. By that we mean months when the residuals of the estimated AR(1) process of the VIX
exceeded the cutoﬀ value x.
To determine a distribution of p(SS|J) we proceed as follows. First, for each country we draw paths from
the posterior distribution of the states (NSS,SS)i, as provided by the Gibbs Sampler. Given the model,
the only relevant observations for the conditional probability are the ones when the country i is in NSS
or has just transitioned to a SS. Hence, in accordance with the data generating process of the model, we
discard all the quarters in which the country is in SS, except the one that marks the beginning of each SS.
Then we look at all those times where the states switch from NSS to SS and simultaneously there is a
jump in the VIXeither in that quarter or the quarter before. We allow this short window to allow for the
possibility of delayed data reporting etc. Let this number be given by ni
SS,J. Similarly, we also determine
all the times when there was a jump in the VIX .Let this number be ni
J.F i n a l l y , d e ﬁne ni
NSS+t as the
numbers of observations when country i is either in NSS or just moved to a SS (a transition, T). We repeat
this procedure for each country separately.
46After completing the above procedure for all countries we sum ni
SS,J,n i
J, and ni
NSS or T across countries.
In accordance with the Bayesian methodology that we have been using throughout, we use a beta distribution
with ﬂat priors for both p(J|NSS or T) and p( T|(NSS or T) and J). In exactly the same way that
we updated the posteriors for p(NSS → SS),and p(SS → NSS) in section 3.1 we obtain the posterior
distributions for the parameters p(J|NSS or T) and p(J and T|(NSS or T) and J),w h i c ha r eg i v e nb y :












In a nutshell, for each iteration of the Gibbs sampler, we determine the number of times when a jump in the
VIX coincided with a transition into a SS for each country. Then we pool across countries. This eﬀectively
imposes the constraint that all countries have the same joint probability distributions between transitions
i n t oaS Sa n dj u m p si nt h eV I X .T h eb e n e ﬁt is that we can obtain more accurate estimates.
As a robustness check we also computed p(J|NSS or T) and p(T|(NSS or T) and J) without imposing
any prior, i.e. by just recording the random draws of:










at each iteration k of the Gibbs Sampler and computing the empirical mean of the corresponding stationary
distribution. The two approaches delivered very similar results, suggesting that our results are not inﬂuenced
by the assumption of a uniform prior.
C Details on the numerical procedure
To solve the model numerically, we proceeded as in Kushner and Dupuis (2001). The procedure is explained
in great detail in Section 5.2 of that book and hence we only provide a sketch. The basic idea is to approximate
the derivatives in all Bellman equations by discretizations. This way one can reexpress the value function at
each point as an appropriately probability weighted average of the value function evaluated at neighboring
points in the state space. That way the discretized version of the Bellman equation coincides with the
solution to a particularly simple dynamic programming equation in discrete time, where the processes can
only transit to neighboring states. For the exact formulas of the transition probabilities as well as the
treatment of jumps we refer the reader to Kushner and Dupuis (2001) Ch. 13.2. Once this simple Markov
chain has been determined, determination of the Value function can proceed by the standard value function
iteration procedure.
47DP r o o f s
Proof. (of Lemma 1) Post development the country’s total available resources At follow a geometric Brown-







where At denotes post development resources. As we establish in section 2.3 the country’s problem (in
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By equation (3.8) in Yong and Zhou (1999) it follows that the above equation can only be satisﬁed if:
µ

















If the parameters satisfy this restriction, then the Euler equation will be satisﬁed with equality, and
starting from Xt =0 , the policy that sets e c∗
t =1will be optimal.
For stronger growth or smaller volatility, Xt =0will be binding as a constraint, starting from Xt =0 .
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